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1. Objective of the study 
The aim of the study is to improve the understanding of irregularities indicated by pesticide 
residues in organic product imports from Ukraine into the EU that were reported in the 
European Commission’s Organic Farming Information System (OFIS) in 2016. On the basis of 
the analysis, some recommendations are derived which are directed towards actors along the 
organic supply chains originating in Ukraine, certification bodies (CBs) operating in this region 
as well as the competent authorities in the EU and other export destinations. 
2. Rationale 
Considerable production potential and long, complex supply chains 
In Ukraine around 400'000 ha of agricultural land and 530’000 ha of wild collection area were 
organically certified as of 2016. The organic certified area has been increasing steadily, 
especially in the last five years. The organic sector is dominated by arable crop farms and 81% 
of the total organic surface area is arable land. Wheat, sunflower seeds, corn and spelt are the 
most important crops. Eighty percent of the organic crop production in Ukraine is exported, 
mainly to Western Europe (Trofimtseva, 2017). The main export countries are The Netherlands, 
Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland and Italy.  
Long and complex trade chains are typical for imports from Ukraine to Western Europe (as 
illustrated in Figure 1). Hence, a bigger number of hazard points for contamination and 
comingling have to be considered. And, due to the mostly large volumes which are traded, any 
irregularity detected in one lot can potentially affect organic operators in many countries 
 
 
Figure 1: Typical organic supply chains from Ukraine to Western Europe  
 
Two typical organic export supply chains from Ukraine are described in the following text block. 
These two cases of export highlight different sets of points along the value chain in which a 
contamination with unauthorized substances may occur.   
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2 typical Ukrainian organic supply chains (SC) 
The direct supply chain - SC1:  
Organic Producer A transports his harvest to his own warehouse / silo. From there, the traded lot 
is loaded into big bags and transported by an external logistic company to the storage cell of an 
importer (trader or processor) in Western Europe. There, the lot is processed in the importer’s 
own processing unit or re-sold to another trader or to a processor.   
The complex supply chain - SC2:  
Organic Producer B brings his harvest to the warehouse / silo of Organic Producer A. Both 
producers have contracts with a Ukrainian trader. From the producer storage facility, the lots are 
picked up by trucks, which bring the lot either to an intermediate warehouse or directly to a 
terminal. This terminal could consist of different and physically separated conventional and 
organic storages. Trucks with organic and conventional lots from different exporters arrive at the 
storage daily. Sometimes, lots are moved from one warehouse to another at the terminal. From 
the terminal, the lot is picked up by terminal trucks and loaded on barges or containers as bulk. 
The traded lots are shipped via vessels to the destination harbour. After unloading the vessel, the 
lot is transported by trucks or train carriage to the storage of the importer and from there to 
further trader storages (incl. export to traders in other countries). Finally the products, are 
delivered via trucks to the final processor.  
Especially in complex supply chains such as SC2, there are multiple risk areas along the value 
chain where contamination can occur.   
 
Ukraine declared as so-called “Risk Country” and the consequences for inspection and 
certification 
In 2014, a large pesticide residue case troubled and affected the organic sector in the EU member 
states. A large lot of organically certified sunflower cake imported into the European market 
through a complex value chain contained pesticide residues. As a consequence, Ukraine and 
other big organic producer countries with complex supply chains from Eastern Europe were 
declared as “risk countries” by the EU Commission. Special import guidelines were launched in 
2016 for sourcing organic commodities from countries with risky supply chains, including 
Ukraine.  
The EU Commission guidelines refer to the following product groups: 
 Cereals; 
 Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten; 
 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or 
medicinal plants; straw and fodder (including sunflower seeds); 
 Residues and waste from the food industries, prepared animal fodder (including oil cake 
and other solid residues, whether ground or in the form of pellets, resulting from the 
extraction of vegetable fats or oils). 
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However, it does not refer to the product group of berries, which frequently contains pesticide 
residues as well. 
At the end of both 2016 and 2017, the situation was reassessed and it was decided that additional 
official controls implemented by the EU Member States' competent authorities on organic 
products imported from these countries would be continued. These controls are carried out in 
accordance with the revised "Guidelines on additional official controls on products originating 
from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russian Federation”1.  
The guidelines further state that at least one representative sample shall be taken of each of the 
consignments at the point of entry into the EU. Sampling shall be done by using the official 
sampling methods used for the control of feed as described in the Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 691/2013 - These samples shall be again analysed for the presence of pesticide residues in an 
accredited laboratory. Whenever pesticide residues are detected, an investigation shall be started 
and a notification in the Commission's Organic Farming Information System (OFIS) shall be made.  
The EU further urges the certification bodies that are active in Ukraine to carry out additional 
control activities such as unannounced inspections and other measures to safeguard and enhance 
the quality assurance along organic supply chains, e.g. lab analysis of traded goods for export. 
The import guidelines further recommended that additional samples be taken of the crops on the 
field during the vegetation period to better assess if unauthorised substances were used 
(especially on those farms, which have been rated as high risk operators by the CBs). 
Controls of the product flow along the supply chain play a fundamental role. They are carried 
out in order to ensure that products meet the relevant standards, that there is a level playing field 
and fair competition for operators, and that products meet consumers' expectations. Controls are 
conducted in order to prevent, detect or follow-up on irregularities/infringements (hereinafter 
"irregularities").2 
Irregularities can be caused by  
1. fraud as an intentional act on all levels of the supply chain, 
2. unintentional wrong labelling, 
3. unintentional comingling of organic lots with conventional lots (e.g. during transport or 
storage), 
4. contamination with unauthorised substances on the field (drift), during transport or 
storage, and 
5. persistent chemicals in the soil, which lead to a contamination of the crop. 
 
Organic Farming Information System (OFIS) 
 
1https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/organic/sites/orgfarming/files/guidelines_addoffctrl_ukraine_russian_fede
ration_and_kazakhstan_final.pdf. 
2 European Commission (2017): Annual Report on EU irregularities (2016) to the Committee on Organic 
Production 
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After the import guidelines entered into force, an increased number of pesticide residue cases in 
Ukraine has been notified in OFIS in 2016.  
Against this background, this study aims to assess the root causes of Ukrainian irregularities, as 
notified in the OFIS. The analysis of OFIS notified irregularities could form an important part of 
a management information system that enables authorities and operators to be aware of risks 
immediately as they arise.  
It must be mentioned, that all food lots exported from Ukraine are analysed for pesticide residues. 
Only if no pesticide residues are found, a certificate of inspection is issued by the exporter CBs 
working in Ukraine. An OFIS notification occurs only when an irregularity, not previously 
detected by the exporter CB in Ukraine, is first detected when the product reaches the import 
country.  
3. Methods 
This study primarily focuses on the irregularities detected in Ukraine and recorded in OFIS. The 
following sources and studies were used in this analysis and help to analyse the cases notified in 
OFIS in 2016 and the nature of irregularities in Ukraine from different perspectives:  
 Information from the EU commission about OFIS notified residue cases in 2016 in 
which Ukrainian exporters were involved, 
 The report of the EU commission on all OFIS cases in 2016, 
 The results of a survey carried out with CBs operating in Ukraine, 
 Detailed information about OFIS cases from two concerned exporter CBs, and 
 The results of dust analyses in storages of customers of two CBs operating in Ukraine. 
4. Results 
4.1 Overview of OFIS notified cases in 2016 on the EU level 
The following overview of the allocation of all total OFIS cases in the EU in 2016 puts the 
number of notified OFIS cases from Ukraine (26 cases) in perspective and helps evaluate if this 
number is average or above average.   
Since 2010, the total number of notified irregularities have increased fivefold, with a total of 398 
cases reported in OFIS in 2016 (see European Commission, 2017 / Figure 2). The rapid increase 
in the number of cases can be due to several reason: the increased number of residue analyses 
that were done, more sensitive measurement equipment detecting lower levels of residue, 
improved controls, and better compliance with reporting requirements. Additionally, the 
increase could be due to general growth in the organic sector, with more product being traded 
and more samples analysed. It should be noted, however, that the increase is also due to the use 
of the OFIS modules to first report on irregularities concerning imported products that were in 
free movement in the EU. 
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Figure 2: Number of OFIS cases in the EU between 2010 – 2016; Source: EU commission, 2017 
 
In 2016, most irregularities were notified by Italy, The Netherlands and Germany. About 30% 
of all notifications were related to products originating from Third Countries.  In the case that 
where EU-origin was reported at first hand, it was later found out that the product originated 
from a Third Country. 
 
 
Figure 3: Allocation of detected irregularities, notified in OFIS in 2016; Source: EU commission, 2017 
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The majority of irregularities (91%) are related to pesticide residues detected in the traded lots. 
Other cases are related to failures in certification, misleading or wrong labelling and traces of 
GMO. In 6 cases (2%), fraud was assumed as reason for a notification (see Figure 3).  
The product categories primarily affected were fruits, vegetables/mushrooms, cereals and herbs. 
About 40% of the pesticide residue cases involved 2 or more substances (in some cases, up to 18 
substances) and often high levels of these residues were measured. Pesticides which are not 
allowed at all in the EU, even in conventional farming, were also detected. 
According to the EU commission, root causes for the irregularities could not be identified in 82% 
of all OFIS cases, even despite the fact that the CBs involved requested investigations to be 
carried out.   
OFIS cases from Third Country imports in 2016 most frequently originated in China, Turkey, 
Egypt, Ukraine and India (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4: Number of irregularity cases by notified country in 2016; Source: EU commission, 2017 
 
4.2 Overview of OFIS notified cases in 2016 from Ukraine  
In 2016, 26 cases reported in OFIS indicated Ukraine as a notified country (see Figure 4).  
Apart from one exception, all notified OFIS cases from Ukraine indicated irregularities due to 
pesticide residues, mostly because of 1 substance detected. In 28% of the cases, two or more 
substances were detected (compared to the average of 45% of all OFIS cases on EU level that 
involved 2 or more substances). Only in a few cases were high levels of contamination reported.  
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Figure 10 illustrates the product groups affected in the 26 cases reported. The highest rate of 
pesticide residue was found in rapeseeds, sunflower seeds and wheat (together accounting for 
around half of all cases).  
All the cases notified in OFIS from the import countries had a valid certificate of inspection as 
transaction certificate as a pre-condition for export. To receive this certificate, lab analysis prior 
to export of the lot in question must indicate negative results. The EU recommends this 
procedure to be carried out for imports from Ukraine and other Third Countries in order to hold 
back product with positive residue analysis results before it is exported.  
 
 
Figure 5: Number of OFIS cases from Ukraine with pesticide residues by product in 2016;  
Source: EU commission, 2017 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of all detected substances reported in the 2016 OFIS cases from 
Ukraine. The substances Chlorpyrifos/Chlorpyrifos-methyl (6 times) and Pirimiphos-methyl (5 
times) were most frequently detected. All other substances were detected a maximum of one or 
two times.  
Chlorpyrifos/Chlorpyrifos-methyl and Pirimiphos-methyl are often used to control storage 
pests. Treatments with these substances for other purposes cannot be excluded, regardless of 
the fact that this may not be currently authorized by the EU. Table 3, therefore, also indicates 
other areas these substances could be potentially be used in.   
Glyphosate, Chlormequat, Mepiquat and Pymetrozine are 4 pesticides that were detected, 
indicating a treatment on the fields.  The assumed root causes for the residues of these pesticides 
as well as other of other substances detected will be discussed further on in this report.    
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Table 1: Overview of all detected substances reported in the 2016 OFIS cases from Ukraine 
Substance 
No. of cases 
with 
substance 
detected 
in OFIS 
cases in 
Ukraine 
2016 
Substance 
category 
Potential scope of application 
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Chlorpyrifos /  
Chlorpyrifos-methyl 6 
Insecticide, 
acaricide 
x x X x x x 
Primiphos-methyl 5 Insecticide (x) x X x  x 
Bifenthrin 
2 
Insecticide, 
acaricide 
x x X  x  
Imidacloprid 2 Insecticide x x   x x 
Propiconazole 2 Fungicide x    x  
Cyproconazole 2 Fungicide x    x  
Glyphosate 2 Herbicide X      
Chlormequat 
2 
Plant growth 
regulator 
X      
Mepiquat 
2 
Plant growth 
regulator 
X      
Cypermethrin 
1 
Insecticide, 
acaricide 
x x X x x x 
Diazinon 
1 
Insecticide, 
acaricide 
(x) x X x x x 
Malathion 
1 
Insecticide, 
acaricide 
x  X    
Pymetrozine 1 Insecticide X      
X = most likely usage; x = usage cannot be excluded; (x) = usage not likely, but theoretically possible  
Sources: EU commission, 2017and own assessment 
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4.3 Survey among certification bodies 
In July 2017, all certification bodies operating in Ukraine were contacted and asked to provide 
information about OFIS cases, they were involved with as an exporter CB. They were also asked 
about all residue-related irregularities of their Ukrainian operators in the year 2016. Lastly, they 
were asked to inform on the analysis results of samples taken during the production season (leaf 
samples) and before export.  
The aim of the survey was to gain a better understanding of the situation concerning cases of 
suspected residue with organic products from Ukraine as well as the results of samplings in the 
field and before export. Based on this analysis, potential risk factors that could lead to irregularities 
were identified. Four certification bodies, which together certify 80% of the total organic area in 
Ukraine, responded to the survey. The data they provided, therefore, allow for a representative 
picture of the situation in 2016 with respect to the findings and assessment of from a CB point of 
view. 
 
Sampling to detect potential residues of unauthorised substances 
Table 2 below indicates the aggregated number of samples taken by the four CBs in 2016 and the 
respective lab results.  
Altogether more than 1’000 samples were taken by the four CBs before export or during the 
production season. In 19% of all samples, residues of unauthorised substances were detected. The 
details of the lab analysis are shown in tables 2 – 4.  
 
Table 2: Aggregated number of product samples taken and analysis by CBs in Ukraine in 2016, according 
to survey 
 Number of 
samples 
taken 
Number of samples, in which 
prohibited substances were 
detected 
Number of downgrades 
to “conventional” of 
concerned crops/plots 
Sampling in total (2016) 1’028 199 73 
Leaf samples during 
the growing season 
(2016) 
226 77 39 
Dust samples in storage 
and/or processing 
facilities (2016) 
17 17 - 
Samples of final 
products harvested 
(prior to export) (2016) 
747 80 13 
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Figure 6: Share of all taken samples with detected residues            Figure 7: Share of leaf samples with detected residues 
 
The survey responses of the four CB illustrate 
significantly differences in the results of sample 
analysis. While one CB reported pesticide residues in 
75% of all samples, another CB only detected 
residues in 4% of the samples (see Figure 6). Pesticide 
residues were detected in an especially high number 
of the leaf samples analysed (86%) (Figure 7). Three 
out of four CBs had to downgrade at least half of the 
crops or plots (fields), where residues were detected. 
(Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Share of downgrades of crops or plots upon residue detection in samplings 
 
It is especially difficult to interpret the very heterogeneous results among the four CBs in the 
survey. The responses from the CBs suggest that some CBs clearly take more samples as others 
during the production season.  
 
Possible root causes of OFIS notified cases  
The four CBs that responded to the survey were involved in 25 out of total 26 OFIS cases in Ukraine 
in 2016. The CBs were asked about the likely root causes of the notified irregularities they need to 
declare to the EU commission. Two certification bodies stated that they were only able to identify 
the root causes in less than 25% of the OFIS cases. The other two CBs state that in 50-75% of the 
cases, the likely root cause could be identified. These answers suggest that in a significant number 
of cases the true reasons of irregularities remain unclear, even after the case was investigated. This 
means basically that some decisions to certify or downgrade lots were taken on the basis of 
uncertainty.  
Figure 9 presents the answers of the CBs with regard to the assumed root causes of the OFIS cases 
the surveyed CBs were involved with in 2016. The results indicate that 14 out of 25 cases were 
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related to contaminations in the storage or during the transport. Comingling (4 cases) and spray 
drift from neighbouring farms (3 cases) represent further relevant root causes.  
Mostly wheat, sunflower seeds or cake, barley and rapeseed were the concerned crops in the 
notified OFIS cases.  
 
Figure 9: Likely root causes of 25 OFIS cases in Ukraine in 2016 (n= 4 CBs) 
 
The CBs were also asked to show on a diagram of a typical complex export value chain, where 
they assume the most relevant hazard points for contamination or comingling to be and then to 
explain the reasons for their answers. Figure 10 illustrates where these dots were placed.  
 
 
Figure 10: Main hazard points for contamination and comingling as assumed by the CBs interviewed  
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According to the CB assessment, the field (application of noncompliant substances or spray drift), 
the storage of the producer (especially when storing crops from different farms) and the harbour 
terminals are assumed to be the most relevant hazard points of contamination and comingling.  
 
Additionally, the authors of the study asked the CBs to rate the relevance of possible root causes 
in Ukraine, based on their own observations. The results of this question are presented in table 3.  
Accordingly to the assessment of the interviewed CBs, most reasons were rated as relevant or 
highly relevant, particularly with regards to the spray drift from neighbours and airplanes and the 
contamination in storage and during the transport.  
 
Table 3: Most relevant root causes of positive lab analysis results in Ukraine in 2016  
(scale: 1 = not relevant to 6 = highly relevant) 
Causes for positive analysis results Rating (average) 
Spray drift from neighbouring conventional farms 5,5 
Spray drift from aerial sprayings 4,5 
Contamination in storage or during transport 4,5 
Comingling with conventional products in production, storage or transport 4,2 
Application of prohibited substances by certified operators during production, 
storage or transport 3,8 
Use of seeds that were treated with unauthorised substances 3,2 
Persistent (heritage) chemicals in the soil, e.g. DDT 2,8 
 
Explanations given by the interviewed CBs for their assessment of risk areas: 
 Contamination on the fields: The following different sources of contamination on the 
farm level were identified: (i) the intentional or unintentional use of noncompliant 
products, (ii) contaminated soil or air, (iii) drift from neighbouring fields where pesticides 
not permitted in organic agriculture were applied, even though a buffer area existed, and 
(iv) unintentional mixing-in of crops grown in buffer areas, even when clearly separated 
harvest and storage solutions for organic and conventional are in place.  
 Contamination in storages: Whenever staff uses substances in storage facilities (e.g.  pest 
treatment after regular cleaning) without knowledge or permission of the operator 
management, contamination with these substances can occur. As sometimes storage 
facilities are not properly cleaned after storing a conventional product, the organic 
product may come in contact with prohibited substances. Storage facilities or transport 
infrastructure which are used exclusively for organic products would be ideal, but they 
are not yet common and widely available in Ukraine.   
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 Contamination at the terminals: Terminals are usually places of turn-over for many 
different types of product with different kinds of quality, belonging to many different 
companies.  Even if essential precautionary measures are taken by operators, something 
could be overlooked. Due to this complexity of activity at terminals, it can often be very 
difficult to identify any source of contamination that may have occurred there.   
 Contamination during loading to (shipping) vessel from vehicles: The use of conveyor 
belts, vehicles and storage containers that are contaminated with prohibited substances 
represent a potential source of contamination during loading. Contact, comingling and 
unintentional mixing with non-organic product here is also easily possible.    
 Contamination during transport: Transport (shipping) vessels and trucks represent are a 
permanent hazard because they are, in many cases, not used exclusively for the transport 
of organic products. Additionally, improper handling of organic product through staff 
that have not been sufficiently trained may also occur. 
 
After having described the result of the survey done with Ukrainian CBs in Chapter 3, the 
subsequent chapters focus on selected cases notified in OFIS. This analysis is based on the data 
collected by the EU commission as well as additional information provided by two CBs operating 
in Ukraine. 
 
4.4 Detailed analysis of 17 OFIS cases in 2016 from Ukraine  
OFIS cases, about which FiBL obtained additional data and background information, were 
analysed in detail. This information was provided to FiBL by two CBs operating in Ukraine 
and for a total of 17 out of the total 26 OFIS reported cases from Ukraine in 2016.  
As described above, all Ukrainian lots which were notified in OFIS, had valid certificates of 
inspection as transaction certificates and indicated negative lab results in Ukraine with regard 
to residues prior to export. 
An analysis of these cases concludes the following potential reasons for discrepancy between 
the detected differences in lab analysis commissioned by the export and import countries: 
 The CBs working in Ukraine and importers may use different sampling methods. A 
contaminated product is often distributed very heterogeneously within a given lot, so 
different sampling methods can lead to different results.   
 Contaminations may have occurred during the transport to the warehouse of the 
importer (e.g. when crops are transported and delivered in bulk by trucks or vessels). 
 Contaminations may have occurred during the unloading process of the importer.  
 Measuring inaccuracy by one of the two operating laboratories may exist, or two labs 
may have different levels of detection.  
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The analysis of OFIS notifications and investigation procedures produced interesting findings: 
(See further detail in Table 10.1 in the Annex). 
 In only 7 out of 17 cases, additional inspections were carried out once an OFIS 
notification was made. In 10 cases, the decision to certify or decertify the lot was made 
by the CB of the Ukrainian exporter on the basis of an additional documentary check 
but without an additional inspection visit. 
 In 11 out of the 17 cases, it was possible to determine a likely source for the residues 
detected in the lots. In the remaining 6 cases, the available information did not allow 
for the identification of a clear cause, but only for the formulation of one or more 
hypotheses.  
 In only one case, an intentional application of unauthorised substances was assumed 
to be the root cause after investigation of the exporter CB. But in this particular case, 
the situation remained unclear because the operator cancelled the working contract 
with the concerned exporter CB after receiving the results from the lab analysis. After 
this occurred, it was not possible to continue investigations into the source of 
contamination. 
 The majority of the cases could be tracked back to a likely contamination during the 
transport or storage of the crops. But in other cases, further likely causes could not be 
excluded. 
 In several cases, the second analysis and investigation done by the exporter CB in 
Ukraine after an OFIS notification was made, showed other substances than initially 
mentioned, were detected. This lead to unclear conclusions.  
 Residues of the following substances were detected more than once in the 17 OFIS 
cases that were analysed in detail:  Pirimiphos-methyl (detected in 4 of the cases), 
Chlorpyrifos (3), Chlormequat (2), Imidacloprid (2), Bifenthrin (2) and Glyphosate (2). 
 
There are four groups of OFIS cases, which are described in the following paragraphs. 
Contamination/comingling in the storage as likely reason (7/17 cases) 
 In 5 cases, an improper cleaning of the storage rooms/installations after treatment was 
identified as the most likely reason for contamination. Four lots, contaminated with 
Pirimiphos-methyl, a typical pesticide used for storage treatments, were released as 
“organic certified” after the exporter CB carried out an additional assessment. One lot 
contaminated with Cypermethrin was blocked because of the general bad condition in 
the warehouse. Cypermethrin is not typically used for storage treatments, which is 
why other reasons for contamination could not be excluded in this case. 
 In 2 cases, the concerned lots were most likely affected by comingling with 
conventional products. Both lots were decertified. Both show residues found in 
conventional products. A mixing with conventional products could not be excluded. 
The residues found were Cyproconazole, Propiconazole and Chlormequat. 
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Contamination/comingling during loading and transport as likely reason (4/17 cases) 
 In 3 cases, a contamination on the truck, which was not cleaned sufficiently before 
loading, was identified as the most likely reason for the contamination.  Two cases 
involved the same facility and the samples were taken from the last truck (a risk-
based sample). In one case, only the product from the last truck was decertified 
because of the higher residue level. In the other case, the lot was not decertified 
because of the low level of detected residues.  
In the third case, the substance probably originated from wood that had been 
transported on the same truck prior to transporting the organic product. This lot was 
released as certified organic after the investigation. Different substances were found: 
Imidacloprid, Bifenthrin and Diazinon.  
 In one case, comingling with conventional products was identified as the most likely 
reason for the detected residues (Imidacloprid, Bifenthrin). Big bags were damaged 
during transport and the product was reloaded into new bags at a place where 
conventional products are also stored. It cannot be excluded that, on this occasion, the 
bags were filled up with conventional products. Therefore, the entire lot was 
decertified.  
Discrepancies between lab results from product analysed by the export and 
import countries as likely reason (5/17 cases) 
 In 4 cases, different results were reported in the analyses made on behalf of the 
exporter CB and those made on behalf of the importer. In all of these cases, the 
residue levels were close to the detection limit. In these cases, it cannot be excluded 
that the differences in results are based on a measuring uncertainty. All four lots in 
question were released by the exporter CB as “organic certified” after carrying out 
additional investigations. 
 In one case involving wild collection products, the situation remains unclear. A mixture 
of 4 pesticide residues was detected in the sample in the EU import country 
(Chlorpyrifos, Prometryn, Tebuconazole, Carbendazym). The sample taken on behalf of 
the CB from the exporter and analysed by another lab indicated no residues of any 
substance. This could be due to a measurement error of the laboratory. However, other 
reasons such as mixing with conventional products or that some wild collectors were 
collected outside of the designated collection area cannot be excluded. The concerned lot 
was released as “organic certified” after additional investigations by the exporter CB 
were conducted. 
Contamination in the field as a likely reason (1/17 cases) 
 In this case, the available information does not allow a clear identification of the root 
cause. The exporter’s certifier suspected an illegal application in the field and 
therefore decertified the lot. The residue detected was Mepiquat, a plant growth 
regulator. As a consequence of the investigations, the operator terminated the contract 
with the certification body. 
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In summary, in two thirds (11 out of 17) of the analysed cases, the blocked lots were ultimately 
released by the exporter CB as “organic certified products”, following a further investigation. 
In 6 (out of 17) cases, products were decertified by the CB from the exporter. If the situation 
remained unclear and only a few lots were affected, only the affected lot was decertified. 
Usually, the CB only decertified the products in cases of intentional contamination, comingling 
with conventional products or improper treatment of storage facilities. Particularly in cases 
where samples were taken from the last truck only, products from this truck were decertified.  
See the Annex for further details of all the 17 cases described above.  
 
4.5 Dust analyses in Ukrainian storages 
Since warehouses were identified as a potential source of contamination, CBs took dust samples 
there if an OFIS notification was made or when the warehouse history indicated there was a 
risk of contamination with unauthorised substances. In particular, old flat storage facilities, as 
are frequently found in Ukraine, were formerly used for purposes other than food harvest 
storage. Hence, they are considered to be potentially risky (Rossier/Bickel, 2015). Therefore, data 
was studied from dust sample analyses from 2016 and 2017 that were provided to the authors 
by 2 CBs.  
CBs took dust samples for different reasons. One CB took samples only when residues were 
found in the crops that had been stored there while the other CB took dust samples in storages 
facilities where they suspected potential contamination.   
Results of dust sample analysis in Ukraine 
The chemical analyses of the dust samples of both CBs show that in all storages investigated, 
the dust contained multiple residues of different unauthorised substances. If grains are stored 
in such places, the contamination risk depends then on the amount of dust present in the storage. 
Whether contamination occurs depends on the amounts of dust present and on the potential 
contact of dust with the product.   
One interesting result was that there was no correlation between the types of pesticides detected 
in the exported crops and those pesticides detected in the dust samples taken from the 
corresponding storage facilities, in which the crops were stored before export. Not all pesticides 
detected in the crops were found in the dust. Vice versa, some pesticides were detected in the 
dust but not in the exported crops. This illustrates the difficulty of interpreting dust samples as 
investigative measures for OFIS cases.  
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Even substances were detected that have no plausible use in a storage facility. This is 
particularly true for the insect repellent Diethyltoluamide (DEET) and for the herbicide 2,4-D, 
but also for a number of fungicides detected. A possible explanation for the presence of some 
residues in the dust samples is that the storage facility had been used in the past to store other 
goods. It is also relevant that under the dry, dark conditions found inside a storage facility, 
pesticides are much more persistent than on the field, and might remain present and active for 
years still.  
One CB also tested the effect of cleaning in one storage by taking samples prior to and after a 
cleaning process. The analysis results of the latter still indicated residues, i.e. it has to be 
concluded, that it is difficult to completely eliminate residues in the dust, even with careful 
manual cleaning.   
Combining the results of all dust samples taken by the two CBs, the following substances were 
most frequently detected in the samples: Phthalimide, Carbendazyme, Imidacloprid and 
Tebucanozole. The potential range of application of these substances is presented in Table 4 and 
described in the subsequent text box.  
Table 4: Overview of the most frequently detected substances of the dust samples analysed 
Substance Category 
Potential scope of application/presence 
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Phthalimide 
Component of dust/ 
fungicide* 
x   x   
Carbendazym fungicide X x   x  
Imidacloprid insecticide X x   x X 
Tebuconazole fungicide x x   x  
 X = most likely usage; x = usage cannot be excluded; (x) = usage not likely, but theoretically 
possible - *Phthalimide is officially classified as a fungicide. However, Phthalimide also could be 
detected because it occurs naturally in dust (see next page) 
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Phthalimide 
According to EU regulation 2016/156, Phthalimide is converted into Folpet using a factor of 2, but 
no Folpet was detected in the dust samples analysed by the CBs, only Phthalimide. Phthalimide 
or Folpet is used as an insecticide on the field. If Folpet is absent, there is a strong suspicion that 
Phthalimide is not related to an application on the field. Phthalimide is found in all kinds of 
products, particularly in dried products.  
Since Phthalimide can be found everywhere including ordinary household dust, it is almost 
impossible to reduce the risk of contamination in the dust in the warehouse even by thoroughly 
cleaning it. Contamination caused by this kind of dust does not indicate practices which are 
prohibited in organic production, and therefore do not constitute a reason for decertification. 
Carbendazym 
Carbendazym is a systemically effective fungicide. It is also a metabolite of Thiophanate methyl, 
which is also a fungicide used in field cultures. Thiophanate methyl is highly mobile in plants 
and converts to Carbendazym. This can lead to residues in the crop. It can also be used in seed 
treatment or as a wood preservative. For more precise statements about the nature of the possible 
use of Thiophanate, the samples and conditions in the warehouse should also be evaluated 
visually, as these might provide important information about the presence of coloured-treated 
seeds. 
Imidacloprid 
The contamination of the dust with Imidacloprid could be caused by the accidental mixing-in of 
treated seeds. Imidacloprid is very often used as a seed dressing. High values of Imidacloprid 
indicate that treated seeds or the substance Imidacloprid itself could have been stored in the 
warehouse in past. For more precise statements about the nature of the possible use of 
Imidacloprid, the samples and conditions in the warehouse should also be visually evaluated, as 
this might give valuable clues/information about the presence of colour-treated seeds. 
Tebuconazole 
Tebuconazole is a fungicide used world-wide and is often found as a residue in cereal samples. 
An accumulation of Tebuconazole in dust indicates that contaminated grain or even the substance 
Tebuconazole itself had been stored in storage facility in the past. A relatively high amount of 
Tebuconazole detected could indicate that the warehouse had not been cleaned well enough 
before storing organic cereals.  
 
General comments on the practice and results of dust sampling in Ukraine 
The results clearly show that not enough knowledge is available for a reliable assessment of 
residues in dust samples. This is especially the case when no records about the history of use in 
the warehouse is available. Yet, it is obvious that residues can be found in dust samples even if 
the product was handled in accordance with organic rules, due diligence was applied and no 
irregularities occurred.  Cocktails of pesticides and other residues can always be found in dust 
(even outside of warehouses). Detailed studies about the complex correlation between residues 
detected in dust of warehouses and residues detected in the product stored there do not exist. It 
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is therefore very difficult, if not impossible, to make any informed predictions as to what amounts 
of residues detected in dust cause or are correlated with increased risks of contamination of the 
product stored there. 
The storage of products that have been treated with pesticides, whether seeds or conventional 
harvested crops, leaves finest particles in the dust. Usual dry and mechanical cleaning methods 
can help to reduce the dust level but does not remove dust completely. If it is known that highly 
contaminated crops or the chemicals had been stored previously in the warehouse, the warehouse 
would need to be decontaminated. The decontamination would be ideally done as a combination 
of dust removal by suction and a subsequent wet cleaning. An even more effective measure is to 
renew the floor of a warehouse.  Both options are very costly.  
Since warehouses seem to have been the most likely place of contamination in the majority of the 
OFIS cases studied, CB controls should focus especially on storage conditions. During risk 
assessment, the history of a warehouse needs to be taken into consideration. Further, dust 
samples should be taken when the storage facility is inspected for the first time. This will provide 
an important baseline value of any substances detected before product enters the storage facility, 
should any contamination be detected in the product afterwards.  
In order to mitigate the risk of contamination, the relationship / correlation between the history 
of a warehouse, the cleaning and risk-reduction measures taken and the corresponding dust 
analyses results needs to be further investigated. It is further suggested to gather more 
information about the relationship between the types of product stored, the residue levels 
detected in the product as well as the residue levels detected in the dust of the surrounding 
storage facility. The results of such research would help in developing guidelines for CBs for 
assessing the risk of contamination posed in a given situation.   
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5. Preventive measures to mitigate risks during 
storage and transport 
It was remarked in previous chapters, that apart from intentional cases of fraud or drift on the 
fields, most risks for contaminations are assumed to occur during storage or transport.  
Product stored in older, flat storages are particularly at risk for any contamination with 
unauthorised substances. Under such conditions, a thorough cleaning before the new harvest is 
stored, is a “must have” in quality management. In the case of severely contaminated storages, it 
is doubtful whether cleaning alone is sufficient. In such cases, it might be necessary to construct 
a new floor which is easy to clean before each loading or to use plastic films to cover the ground 
floor. 
Most transport systems which are used for moving organic goods from the producer to the 
customer storage facility need to be checked and treated with special care. As with storage 
containers, they are a potential source of contamination as they come in contact with the product 
and may have been used for different purposes previously.  
Therefore, this chapter highlights some preventive measures which CBs and quality management 
experts in Ukraine recommend organic operators implement in order to mitigate risks of 
contamination in storage facilities and during transport between storage facilities. These 
recommendations are based on guidelines developed by Guliyeva /Richter (2018) and detailed in 
a separate publication.  
Basic recommendations for organic operators to mitigate risk of contamination during storage 
and transport: 
 develop and implement a formal management of organic critical points, which includes 
a whole-farm approach;  
 designate  machines and transport vessels for exclusively for the use with organic 
products; and  
 train and motivated staff to carefully implement the measures of the risk management 
system. 
Even if an operator knows the own procedures quite well, he should still record all steps taken 
in order to be prepared for possible controls in the case that an irregularity is detected. When 
contamination is detected, all steps that were carried out have to be traced back in order to 
identify the likely source of contamination. All procedures and conformity records must be 
present in a case of an investigation of the CB. Currently, such records are oftentimes insufficient 
at farm or trader level.   
In order to avoid unintentional nonconformities, the operator should remain in close 
communication with its CB, particularly in cases of uncertainty or when carrying out cleaning 
procedures in the warehouse.  
As the product moves along the value chain, the ownership of a lot might frequently change. This 
process of ownership transfer and the physical product handling needs to be clear and 
transparent. It is of utmost importance that the responsibility and duties of both parties (buyer 
and seller) in the supply chain are clear.  
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It is further recommended that external logistic activities between harvest and sales are to be kept 
to a minimum and that the goods be bagged and the bag sealed at the place of production.   
The following list indicates further preventive measures that can be taken to reduce the risk of 
contamination.  
Preventive measures during intermediate storage: 
 plan the crop volumes and appropriate places for the storage far in advance of harvesting. 
 implement procedures to control the storage conditions of organic products and carry 
out risk assessments in order to evaluate contamination risks.  
 ensure a thorough cleaning of storage facilities, possibly by delegating this work to 
professionally skilled staff.  
 conduct  proper record-keeping of the products stored. 
 train staff involved in the proper handling of the product during intermediate storage, 
while recording and monitoring their level of knowledge and implementation of proper 
handling procedures.  
 
Preventive measures in handling of storage equipment:   
 designate equipment to be used exclusively for the storage of organic goods 
 develop and apply procedures for choosing appropriate equipment. 
 develop and introduce  proper  cleaning measures  for  the equipment  especially when  
it is used both for organic and non-organic goods.  
 train staff involved in the proper post-harvest treatment of organic goods, while 
recording and monitoring their level of knowledge and implementation of proper 
handling procedures.  
 
Preventive measures for the transport of organic crops:  
 prioritize the use of the company´s own transport, preferably using it only for the 
transport of organic products.  
 source additional safe transport options to be used in case of emergencies when the main 
transport options cannot be used.  
 select leased transport options with the lowest risk for cross-contamination of the organic 
product.   
 define a set of criteria for selecting and authorizing any kind of logistic option to be used 
for the transport of organic food. This needs to be done for company own transport 
schemes as well as for rented/leased schemes.  
 define a procedure for monitoring and controlling the conditions and the travel route of 
organic products transportation (for example, by using GPS trackers). 
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 train all staff involved in transport operations and closely supervise the activities of these 
persons.  
 ensure thorough cleaning of the truck/vessel/container, possibly by delegating this work 
to professionally skilled staff. 
 set up an internal notification and registration procedure to document all situations in 
which problems occur in the compliance of the policies established by the company.  
 define a procedure for analysing these problems and implementing measures, learn from 
the experiences and prevent the same problems in the future.  
 
Preventive measures for terminals of vessel shipment:   
 designate storage containers in the terminals to be used exclusively for organic goods.   
 seal the warehouses and load the vehicles / transport facilities under the supervision of 
an expert of the survey company. 
 document all product movement using a designated monitoring system.  
 train all staff involved at the terminal in transport operations and closely supervise the 
activities of these persons.   
 minimize the use of intermediate equipment.  
 
The crucial factor of the organic risk management system is the personnel management and the 
introduction of an efficient training system for the staff so they are aware about the risks and the 
prevention measures in product handling.  
Following these recommendations will not guarantee a full avoidance of risks, but it does support 
the process of identifying, controlling and mitigating individual risks.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This study set out (1) to improve the understanding situation concerning residues found in 
organic food products exported from Ukraine, and (2) to formulate guidelines for identifying and 
reducing risks for contamination through non-permitted substances based on the results of an in-
depth analysis of those residue cases notified in the European Commission’s Organic Farming 
Information System (OFIS) in 2016.  
Not surprisingly, the combination of various factors such as (i) the additional sampling required 
by the new EU import guidelines, (ii) the growing number of exported organic lots from Ukraine, 
and (iii) the improved analysis technology, led to an increased total number of cases of 
irregularities notified in OFIS in comparison to previous years. Nevertheless, the number of 
irregularities in Ukraine in 2016, notified in OFIS, is moderate (affecting estimated < 1% of all 
exported consignments from Ukraine). Of the lots affected, two thirds were ultimately released 
as “organic” after additional investigations had been carried out by the respective export CB.  
 23 
 
Yet, if analysis results of samples taken by the CB’s prior the export, i.e. from crops during the 
growing season and from lots before they are released for export are included in the risk 
assessment, Ukraine and its neighbouring countries do need to be considered as relatively high 
risk countries in terms of contamination and irregularities. It is further interesting to note that the 
likeliness of residue findings vary a lot among different CBs. The reasons why some CB’s have a 
high share of residue findings whereas for others proportionally much less residues are found 
are unclear and should be the subject of further assessments. One assumption is that some CBs 
took risk-oriented samples whereas others did not. 
Sampling during the production process (field/leafs and dust) effectively supports organic 
integrity. Most CB nevertheless focus on residue free final products. The way a CB responds on 
detected irregularities, i.e. investigates a case and derives “lessons learnt” is very important.  
A majority of OFIS cases from Ukrainian exports seems to be linked to insufficient management 
of handling procedure during the storage processes and the transport. However, drift on the field 
or the intentional use of unauthorised substances are also potential sources of irregularities 
related to exports from Ukraine.   
Apart from those cases for which likely root causes have been identified, no clear explanation for 
discrepancies between lab results between export and import countries could be found for nearly 
one third of the Ukrainian OFIS cases. Further investigations should be carried out to help 
identify the reasons for the relatively large differences between the lab results of samples taken 
from the same trade lots. It is important to better understand these discrepancies in sample 
measurements because these may lead to significant negative economic impacts for everyone 
involved in the value chain, even though no rules may have been broken. 
Another recommendation resulting from this study is to focus more on detecting potential 
contaminations on the field during the period of crop cultivation. Special attention should be given 
here to the testing of leaf sample of crops in which contamination has been detected in the past: 
rapeseeds, sunflower seeds or high quality milling wheat. CB’s should have guidelines on how 
and when leaf samples should be best taken.   
Ukrainian organic operators often complain that all Ukrainian operators are put in the same 
basket and treated as high-risk suppliers. In response to the stricter regulations imposed on them, 
operators and experts participating in the International Conference “Improving Integrity of 
Organic Supply Chains” in Odesa 2017 called for an amendment of the inspection policy. Instead 
of labelling entire countries as high-risk, focus should rather be placed on risky value chains. 
Supply chains considered high-risk should be relieved from extra measures, once they have 
demonstrated consistent compliance.  
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8. Annex 
10.1 Overview of the analysed OFIS cases from Ukraine, which led to a decertification of lots/products after the investigation 
Product Irregularity - in case 
of detected pesticide 
residue (mg/kg) 
Decertification by 
the exporter CB 
Assumed place of 
contamination/ 
comingling 
Investiga-
tions by CB 
Reason of decertification after 
discussion with CB 
Accepted explanation of exporter CB in 
OFIS notification paper 
Spelt, shelled Chlormequat (0,210) 1 out of 4 lots Storage  Additional 
inspection 
 Unclear situation, goods were 
probably mixed.  
 In a second analysis no 
Chlormequat, but Pirimiphos-
methyl had been detected, a 
typical insecticide for 
storages. This residue could 
have been caused by a 
treatment of an empty 
storage. 
Additional unannounced inspection 
(verifying operators explanation, traceability) 
and sampling was performed and showed the 
following: 
 Contamination was considered to 
be possible because conventional 
products were stored in the same 
storage (probably due to 
insufficient preventive measures 
after fumigation of empty storage). 
Rape seed Mepiquat (0,070) Entire lot Field Additional 
inspection 
 Unclear situation, probably 
application on the field. It 
remains unclear, if the 
contamination was possible 
by drift or application.  
 High risk farm, but operator 
cancelled contract with the 
exporter CB, therefore no 
more investigations could be 
carried out.  
Additional inspection took place  with 
traceability check, sampling and analyzing 
new plant from the same field. 
 Exporter CB accepted operator’s 
explanations concerning 
contamination of rape from 
neighbour fields. SKAL expressed 
their doubts on possibility of drift. 
Therefore, the entire lot was 
decertified. 
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Product Irregularity - in case 
of detected pesticide 
residue (mg/kg) 
Decertification by 
the exporter CB 
Assumed place of 
contamination/ 
comingling 
Investiga-
tions by CB 
Reason of decertification after 
discussion with CB 
Accepted explanation of exporter CB in 
OFIS notification paper 
Mustard 
black, seeds 
Imidacloprid (0,390)  
Bifenthrin (0,027) 
Entire lot Transport/truck Additional 
document 
check 
Likely reason identified: fraud or 
contamination. Damaged big bags were 
repacked. 
The analysis of dust samples of the 
warehouse showed residues of many 
substances, because it is an old 
warehouse, which is not easy to clean 
properly. 
Additional information from the operator 
about storage were checked. Samples taken 
before export and by another importer tested 
negative. 
 According to information received 
from the operator as well as from 
the carrier, big bags were damaged 
during transportation, and the 
driver did repacking of mustard 
seeds in the storage where 
traditional product could be 
responsible for the contamination or 
mixing 
Sunflower seeds Diazinon (0,033) 4 lots Transport/truck Additional 
document 
check 
Likely reason identified: a truck was not 
cleaned, only 1 of 24 truck loads showed 
residues. The lot of the concerned truck 
was decertified.  
 Additional information and 
communication with the CB of the 
importer about storage conditions 
and transportations were checked. 
 Taking into account the fact that 
there were 4 consignments in which 
residues were found, and all other 
consignments were clean, the 
exporter CB made the decision to 
block sunflower seeds from the 
contaminated consignements. 
Operator claims that he never used 
the detected pesticides. CB put 
Operator in a higher risk level with 
additional analysis 
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Product Irregularity - in case 
of detected pesticide 
residue (mg/kg) 
Decertification by 
the exporter CB 
Assumed place of 
contamination/ 
comingling 
Investiga-
tions by CB 
Reason of decertification after 
discussion with CB 
Accepted explanation of exporter CB in 
OFIS notification paper 
Mustard 
brown, seeds 
Cypermethrin (0,051) Entire lot Storage  Additional 
inspection 
 Likely reason identified: 
treatment of empty storage. 
The residue found is used for 
timber protection.  
 The analysis of dust samples 
of the warehouse showed 
residues of many substances. 
Operator informed that 
product was stored outside 
during fumigation, but he has 
only one storage place! 
 Two unannounced inspections 
including sampling of product and 
dust were conducted to the 
producer with purpose of verifying 
product flow and analysis. 
 Operator stated that contamination 
might have been caused by the 
fumigation in the empty storages. It 
was decided to analyze control 
sample in an EU laboratory. 
 
Wheat Cyproconazole (0,015)  
Propiconazole (0,019) 
Entire lot Storage Additional 
inspection 
Clear situation, the product was 
decertified because of fraud. 
Explanation was accepted, operator was 
always very cooperative and provied 
full information on time. 
 
Unannounced additional inspection had taken 
place shortly before the findings of the 
contamination were known, no not allowed 
inputs were found. 
 The truck affected was one of the 
last ones to be loaded with organic 
wheat. By mistake, wheat from 
another warehouse  was taken, 
which is not suitable for storing 
organic goods and where 
conventional wheat was stored. The 
mistake happened because the chief 
warehouse manager was not 
available during loading.  
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10.2 Overview of the analysed OFIS cases from Ukraine, which led to a release of lots/products as “organic certified” 
Product Irregularity - in case 
of detected pesticide 
residue (mg/kg) 
Assumed place of 
contamination/cominglin
g 
Investiga-
tions by CB 
Assumed reason of contamination by 
CB after discussion with FiBL 
Accepted explanation of exporter CB in OFIS notification 
paper 
Chamomille Multiple residues (4) 
Chlorpyrifos(-ethyl) 
(0,028), Prometryn 
(0,018), Tebuconazole 
(0,40), Carbendazym 
(0,010) 
None Additional 
inspection 
 Unclear situation, after the 
laboratories in export and import 
country indicated different results.  
 Another reason could be that the lot 
was mixed by the importer.  
 Additional unannounced inspection on 29.03.2016 was 
performed and samples for analysis were taken. 
 According to the inspection results, traceability was checked 
and approved, and information from the operator was verified. 
 Results of a second analysis in the Eurofins lab as well as results 
of analysis from the Ukrainian laboratory before export were 
negative, no residues detected. 
Rape seed Malathion (0,019)  
Chlorpyrifos(-methyl) 
(0,016) 
None  Additional 
document 
check 
 Unclear situation, the substance 
found is near the detection limit. The 
lot could have been contaminated in 
different locations, but not in 
Ukraine.  
 Sampling was done by importer of 
the product, samples taken before 
export from Ukraine were negative. 
 Additional document checks of analysis results and traceability 
check were conducted. 
 Notification was accepted before all results of investigations 
were received: Contamination was considered to be possible 
during transport or storing of organic products (before or after 
export).  
 Sampling before export was performed on 30.10.2015, and 
analysis result received on 15.11.2015. Export of rape was done 
during 01.-19.02.2016. 
 Pesticides found could be used in fumigants, and two months 
is a long period for storing the product. It could have been be 
contaminated at that time, as well as during exporting. There is 
no information about conditions of sampling by the importer. 
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Product Irregularity - in case 
of detected pesticide 
residue (mg/kg) 
Assumed place of 
contamination/comingling 
Investiga-
tions by 
CB 
Assumed reason of contamination by 
CB after discussion with FiBL 
Accepted explanation of exporter CB in OFIS notification 
paper 
Millet, 
hulled 
Primiphos-methyl 
(0,005) 
Storage Additional 
document 
check 
 Likely reason identified: treatment of 
empty storage and improper cleaning 
afterwards. 
 Since the residue level detected was 
very low and close to the detection 
limit, measuring inaccuracy in the lab 
cannot be excluded.  
 Additional information about fumigation of storage and 
conditions of transport were checked and verified. 
 Contamination was considered to be possible because of 
fumigation of the empty storages with Actelic. It cannot be 
excluded, that the waiting period was not as long as necessary 
or storages were not cleaned well enough. Residues of Pirimifos 
Methyl after import were low (0,005), so it was decided that this 
could have been due to measurement inaccuracy in the 
laboratory. 
Spelt Pirimiphos-methyl 
(0,029) 
Storage Additional 
document 
check 
Likely reason identified: treatment of 
empty storage and improper cleaning 
afterwards 
Information about fumigation and cleaning was checked again.  
CB was informed about the fumigation of empty storage facilities 
and appropriate cleaning measures. No residues were detected 
during analysis of the concerned lot (3CG) before export.  
Corn Bifentrin (0,013) Transport/truck Additional 
document 
check 
 The vessel was not cleaned. 
 Prior to the corn, wood was loaded 
on the truck and Bifentrin is often 
used for timber protection. 
 Additional information from importers, traceability 
documentation and expert opinions showed that there was no 
evidence organic regulation having been broken by the 
operator. 
 Analytical results from other importers of the same lot all 
showed negative results.  
Spelt, 
shelled 
Pirimiphos-methyl 
(0,012) 
Chlormequat (0,001) 
storage  Additional 
document 
check 
Likely reason identified: treatment of 
empty storage with Pirimiphos-methyl 
and insufficient cleaning afterwards. 
The Chlormequat found is near the 
detection limit. One possible 
explanation for this is that the sample 
was taken from the last truck, meaning 
that the last part of the lot could be 
contaminated with dust from the 
warehouse. 
Previous cases of detection of Pirimiphos-methyl were compared 
with the new findings, additional sampling done by the operator. 
 Samples before export showed a level of 0.01 mg/kg 
Pirimiphos-methyl. Operator cleaned spelt one more time 
and preventive measures were implemented on place. 
 Empty storage was treated with Pirimiphos-methyl and 
probably the waiting period before filling with product 
again was too short. 
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Product Irregularity - in case 
of detected pesticide 
residue (mg/kg) 
Assumed place of 
contamination/comingling 
Investiga-
tions by 
CB 
Assumed reason of contamination by 
CB after discussion with FiBL 
Accepted explanation of exporter CB in OFIS notification 
paper 
Corn Chlorpyrifos-ethyl 
(0,012) 
None  Additional 
document 
check 
Unclear situation: the amount detected 
is very low and near the detection limit, 
samples in storage and before loading 
tested negative.  
The importer and a non-Ukrainian 
exporter was responsible for transport. 
If contamination took place and there 
was no measurement error in the 
laboratory, contamination could have 
occurred both during transport and 
storage.  
Information from operator, traceability documentation and 
analysis were checked and verified. There was no Chlorpyrifos-
ethyl used on the farm. The importer’s CB was asked to check 
transportation and storage conditions after export. There is a gap 
of two month between export and import that was unaccounted 
for. The importer was responsible for the storage during this 
time.  
Samples taken before export were negative.  
Millet, 
hulled 
Pirimiphos-methyl 
(0,017) 
Storage  Additional 
document 
check 
Likely reason: Treatment of empty 
storage, insufficient cleaning afterwards 
or waiting periods after cleaning not 
long enough. 
Additional information about fumigation of storages and about 
conditions of transportation were requested and received. 
The verification of this information showed that after the 
fumigation of empty storage facilities, they were cleaned and 
ventilated and there was a waiting period before storing organic 
goods.  
Sunflower 
seeds 
Imidacloprid (0,015) Transport/truck Additional 
document 
check 
Likely reason: Treatment of empty 
storage and not sufficient cleaning 
subsequently. 
Sample was taken from the last truck. 
Dust samples showed a lot of 
substances. 
Additional information about storage conditions and 
transportation was requested from the operator and CB of the 
importer as well as verification of information received.  
An additional control of the other trucks used was carried out by 
the importer and showed the absence of the residues. Taking into 
account that fact that residue were detected only in one truck of 
the nine used, it could have been that the cleaning of storage was 
not sufficient or that one of the trucks was contaminated. 
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Product Irregularity - in case 
of detected pesticide 
residue (mg/kg) 
Assumed place of 
contamination/comingling 
Investiga-
tions by 
CB 
Assumed reason of contamination by 
CB after discussion with FiBL 
Accepted explanation of exporter CB in OFIS notification 
paper 
Corn Glyphosate (0,070) None  Additional 
inspection 
Unclear situation, the amount found is 
near the detection limit. Contamination 
could have been occurred due to 
damaged bags: Waggon was overloaded 
with three bags which were broken. 
Planned inspection was conducted, 
samples from the same field were taken 
and no residues were found. Operator 
carried out a very thorough analysis and 
many samples were taken. Results from 
the same lot before export showed 
negative results. 
Additional unannounced inspection with sampling is planned. 
Notification is accepted before all investigations were carried 
out. 
Before sampling by the importer, product was stored in the 
import country for about two weeks and it is not known how 
importer handled and stored the product during that time.  
Millet Glyphosate (0,030) None  Additional 
inspection 
Unclear situation, the amount found is 
near the detection limit. Contamination 
could also have occurred in warehouse  
Additional inspection of producer of exported product were 
conducted by sampling and the product flow of the exporter was 
verified.  
Results showed no traces of glyphosate and there was no 
evidence that this prohibited substance was used. Such low 
concentration may have been due to contamination, and not to 
direct application by the farmer or processor.  
 
 
 
